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Abstract
Instead of the question, ‘do we have an obligation to obey the law?,’ we should
first ask the more modest question, ‘do we have reasons to obey the law?’
This paper offers a new account of the notion of the content-independence of
legal reasons in terms of the grounding relation. That account is then used
to mount a defense of the claim that we do indeed have content-independent
moral reasons to obey the law (because it is the law), and that these reasons,
very plausibly, often amount to an obligation to so-act.
Introduction
In this paper, I shall ask whether we have content-independent moral reasons to
obey the law, and I shall make some claims about what we mean when we ask this
question. I shall also inquire after the strength of such reasons. In other words,
I shall ask whether we ought morally to do as the law demands, because the law
demands it.
This is a version of a very old question, but it is in one important way different from
that question. Traditionally, we ask whether subjects aremorally obligated to obey the
*I owe special thanks to Selim Berker and Derek Parfit for their extensive and extremely helpful
comments on an early draft of this paper. Small tribute though it is, I dedicate this paper to Derek
Parfit in memoriam. I am also particularly indebted to James Brandt, who read and commented on
several drafts. For further helpful comments and discussion, I am also very grateful to Adriana Al-
faro Altamirano, Arthur Applbaum, Eric Beerbohm, Noam Gur, Chris Havasy, and two anonymous
reviewers for this journal.
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law, or whether, equivalently, they have a moral duty to do so.1 I believe we should
instead begin with the more modest question of whether we have moral reasons to
obey the law. This question retains the structure of the traditional question, but it is
at the same time simpler and clearer, and so easier to answer. Moreover, many take
reasons to contribute to obligations, so in answering the question about reasons, we
may also make progress on the question about obligation.2
The answer to this question I shall defend is Yes: we do very often havemoral reasons
to obey the law, because it is the law, in the content-independent sense. Moreover, I
shall suggest that these reasons very often amount to an obligation to so-act.
This answer goes against a strong current in political and legal philosophy which has
led many to endorse philosophical anarchism,3 the family of views often expressed
by some combination of the claims (1–3):
1. Any reasons we may seem to have to do as the law demands are really just
reasons to do as we ought full stop, independent of the law, in virtue of our
ordinary moral obligations; or
2. Whatever conditions would obligate us to do as the law demands are not met,
and maybe could not be met, by the law; or
3. Any such apparent reasons are merely prudential reasons to act so as to avoid
being fined or punished by the state.
The law, on any of these views, is not morally significant.4
Separately, some have been recently convinced that there can be no content-
independent reasons to obey the law, or at least that no successful account of what
1Following common practice in this literature, I will not distinguish between obligation and duty.
My discussion of the former should be read as applying as well to the latter. The best-known view that
does distinguish these concepts in this context is Rawls’s. For him, obligations are interpersonally
incurred (like promises, for example), whereas duties may be “natural.” See Rawls, A Theory of Justice,
98–101, §19.
2I substantiate this point in slightly greater detail in the next section. Beyond this, the benefit of
asking the reasons question before the obligation question will also (I hope) be demonstrated by the
fruit of what follows, taken as a whole.
3Matthew Noah Smith goes so far as to write that “there may be a consensus amongst moral and
political philosophers that there is not today any existing obligation to obey the law.” Smith, “Political
Obligation and the Self.” Similar claims may be found in Edmundson, “State of the Art”; Gur, “Are Le-
gal Rules Content-Independent Reasons?”; Klosko, “Are Political Obligations Content Independent?”
4I do not here address Wolff ’s early anarchist view, which focuses on the agential costs to following
an authority’s directive, nor Smith’s recent defense of a related view. To address these views, distinc-
tive as they are, would require a separate paper. As Smith notes, moreover, that view “has never had
much traction” in the literature (though his paper is an attempt to revive it). See Wolff, In Defense of
Anarchism; Smith, “Political Obligation and the Self.”
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such reasons might amount to has yet been given.5 This separate conclusion only
strengthens the appeal of the philosophical anarchist’s claim, by undermining the
very possibility of having a reason to do as the law demands because it is what the
law demands.
I believe we can answer both of these skeptical challenges. Content independence is
not as mysterious as it has often been made to seem. On the view I propose, when
we talk of content independence, we are making claims about grounding. When we
claim that the law provides content-independent reasons for its subjects to𝜑, we are
claiming that there is a distinctive property of the law which grounds a moral reason
to 𝜑, which is another way of claiming simply that the law’s distinctive properties
are morally significant.
When we understand content independence in this way, it becomes easier to see
that the law very plausibly does provide content-independent reasons to do as it
demands. We can also see that such reasons may often combine, sometimes with
non-legal reasons and sometimes on their own, to amount to an obligation to obey
the law. While my remarks on this point must remain schematic—whether we are in
fact obligated by the law depends on further commitments regarding the status and
normative force of various candidate properties of the law, regarding the normative
circumstances of particular subjects, as well as regarding competing conceptions of
the concept of obligation—we can nevertheless conclude that, very plausibly, the law
often succeeds in morally obligating us. The anarchist’s position is thus importantly
undermined.
1. Preliminaries
It may help to begin by first offering some definitions and clarifications, if only
because the literature on political obligation has suffered, in my view, from some
unclarity about reasons. I follow Scanlon and Parfit in using the “purely” or “gen-
uinely” normative concept of a reason, according to which a reason to 𝜑 may be
helpfully redescribed as a fact that counts in favor of 𝜑-ing.6 To have at least one
reason to 𝜑 is the same as having “some reason,” or simply “reasons” to 𝜑, though
we may have some reason to 𝜑 even when there is some other act that we ought to
do instead, because the reasons favoring that act are stronger than our reasons to
5See Markwick, “Law and Content-Independent Reasons”; Markwick, “Independent of Content.”
Sciaraffa, “On Content-Independent Reasons” argues for a similar conclusion.
6Scanlon, Being Realistic about Reasons, 1–15; Parfit, On What Matters, 31–37.
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𝜑.7 When the balance of reasons counts decisively in favor of our𝜑-ing, in the sense
that our reasons to 𝜑 outweigh any competing reasons not to 𝜑, or to do some other
act instead, we can say that we have “decisive reason” to 𝜑, which is one way of say-
ing simply that we ought to 𝜑.8 If our reasons are such that we may permissibly 𝜑
but are not required to 𝜑, we say that we have “sufficient reason” to 𝜑.
When I speak of someone’s “having” a reason to 𝜑, I do not mean to imply any-
thing about this person’s own awareness of her reasons, nor about her motivational
states.9 In the way I use the term, a person’s having a reason to 𝜑 is just the same
as there being a reason for her to 𝜑, which is just the same as there being some fact
that counts in favor of her 𝜑-ing. Similarly, when I say that some fact “gives” or
“provides” us with a reason to 𝜑, I mean only that that fact is a reason for us to 𝜑,
by counting in favor of our 𝜑-ing. By extension, when I say that the law gives or
provides us with a reason to 𝜑, I mean that the fact that the law demands that we 𝜑
is a reason for us to 𝜑, or counts in favor of our 𝜑-ing.10 In this paper I shall discuss
only ideal cases, so there will be no need to distinguish between reasons for action
and the merely apparent or contextually normative reasons for action that wemay be
said to have, or be aware of, in virtue of our beliefs about which facts count in favor
of which acts. Only in these non-ideal cases is it useful, I believe, to talk of some-
one’s “having a reason” in this other sense, and similarly, only in non-ideal cases
is it useful to talk of something “giving” a reason to someone in the corresponding
sense.
Additionally, it is important to say that I take myself to be discussing moral reasons,
as distinct from merely prudential reasons, epistemic reasons, reasons of rationality,
and so on. I do not take a view on the issue of what makes our moral reasons distinct
from other kinds of normative reasons; I claim only that there is a useful distinction
to be drawn.
Another point of unclarity in the literature has been regarding the nature of obliga-
tion. As mentioned already, we are traditionally confronted with what I shall call the
“obligation question,” which asks,
7Some refer to these as pro tanto reasons, as a way of indicating that these reasons can weigh
together, outweigh, and be outweighed by other reasons. For my purposes, writing “pro tanto” in front
of “reason” does not add anything, as all of the reasons I discuss can weigh together, outweigh, and
can be outweighed by other reasons.
8There are other senses of “ought,” but I shall stick to the decisive reason-implying sense here.
9The exception to this is when I consider the view, defended by Hart and Raz, that our reasons to
obey the law require that we act for certain reasons and not others. See section 3(b).
10It may be natural to talk of some people, or even the law, “giving reasons” to others, but such talk
is often misleading, and I shall avoid it. Facts supply reasons, and the only helpful sense in which
people may give reasons to others is by helping create (as by promising or commanding) or by calling
attention to (as by pointing out) such facts. On this point, see Enoch, “Reason-Giving and the Law.”
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Are subjects obligated to do as the law demands, in virtue of it
so-demanding?
However, rather than begin with the obligation question, I suggest that we first ask
the more modest “reasons question”:
Do subjects have reasons to do as the law demands, because the law
demands it?
This is for several reasons. First, because the concept of obligation, particularly
in this context, is insufficiently clear. Its various conceptions are not normally well
distinguished, yet what we mean by “S is obligated to𝜑” of course bears importantly
on what we should think about whether subjects are obligated to obey the law.11
Second, the concept of a reason is simpler, as well as (arguably) more fundamental,
than the concept of an obligation. We can thusmore clearly knowwhat we are asking
when we ask the reasons question, and so we can more clearly know whether we
have an answer. Third, and relatedly, because it is widely thought (and I believe)
that reasons contribute to obligations. Precisely how they do so is a matter of debate,
though we need not make any more specific commitments here than that they do.
If it is true that reasons contribute to obligations, then in answering the reasons
question, we have also (at least partly) answered the obligation question.
Because I ultimately wish to discuss philosophical anarchism, whose standard for-
mulation denies that subjects are morally obligated to obey the law, I will not be
able to entirely avoid obligation-talk. For our purposes, I shall use “normally deci-
sive reason” as a moderately ecumenical analysis of the concept of obligation. This
is not because I take it to be a particularly good analysis of what obligation is (it
is not), but rather because it seems extensionally compatible with many reasonable
ways of speaking about obligation and duty, such as when Ross discusses our “prima
facie duties” to act in certain ways, and also with the idea that obligations are those
acts which are, in view of the balance of reasons, morally required.12 Still, my use is
11For instance, a common thought is that for S to be under amoral obligation to𝜑 is for it to bewrong
for S not to 𝜑. While this may be an attractive understanding of moral obligation in general, it is less
clearly helpful in the context at hand, not least because it is unclear who or what would be wronged by
a failure to obey the law. By contrast, Green analyzes obligations in this context as requirements with
which subjects are “bound to conform,” where the notion of being bound is explained as being “non-
optional” or compulsory. (See Green, “Legal Obligation and Authority,” italics in the original.) He is
here following Hart, who makes similar remarks in “Legal and Moral Obligation.” This is intuitively
closer to what I believe most theorists in this literature have in mind, although it is clearly stronger
than the previous conception. Moreover, these further notions (of being “bound,” “non-optionality,”
and so on) are hardly more perspicuous than the original.
12Edmundson makes a similar claim, writing that the duty to obey the law is regarded “as one that
is ordinarily decisive” despite being “subject to being defeated or outweighed by countervailing moral
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a substantive commitment, and so alternative conceptions of obligation may lead to
disagreement withmy claims later in the paper about our reasons to reject philosoph-
ical anarchism. Since I know of no anarchist position that understands obligation in
a way that is incompatible with my commitment here, it would fall to the anarchist
to develop such a position.
Finally, it should be borne in mind throughout that we must always be careful to
distinguish some reason for action [r] from a “summary reason” given by a set of
reasons for that action that includes [r] as one member among others of the set,
lest we double count the reasons.13 Thus, to borrow Parfit’s example, the fact that
some medicine is the cheapest and most effective may make it the best medicine,
but when we talk of the reasons for some person to take this medicine, we would
make a mistake if we claim that this person has three reasons to do so: that it is the
cheapest, the most effective, and the best.
2. Content Independence
We can now consider the idea of the content independence of certain reasons, including
reasons given by the law. Roughly, the idea is that a reason is content independent
if, as Hart puts it, it is
intended to function as a reason independently of the nature or charac-
ter of the actions to be done;14
or, as Raz puts it, if
there is no direct connection between the reason and the action for
which it is a reason.15
In the case of content-independent “legal reasons”—the reasons given by acts being
prohibited, permitted, or required by the law—we say that such reasons are to do
as the law demands, whatever the law demands, no matter the moral, rational, or
perhaps even legal merits of what is demanded.16 Taken another way, the idea of
considerations.” See “State of the Art,” 215–16.
13Throughout the paper, I will use brackets to indicate facts: “[r]” means “the fact that r.”
14Hart, Essays on Bentham, 254. It has often been remarked, pace Hart, that intention seems largely
beside the point.
15Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 35–37.
16The notion is typically understood to allow limiting cases, such as when the law’s demands are
grossly immoral, unjust, or perhaps when the law’s demands are too demanding. I shall ignore such
limiting cases—while acknowledging their deep importance in other contexts—for the purposes of
this discussion.
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content independence is the thing that we mean by “because it is the law” when we
discuss the claim that we have reasons to obey the law because it is the law.
It will help to begin by discussing a recent skeptical challenge. The legal philosopher
Paul Markwick has rightly questioned the idea that all reasons are, as such, either
content dependent or content independent. Reasons are, I have claimed, facts that
count in favor of actions. On this understanding, it is mysterious what it wouldmean
to claim that some reasons bear the fundamental property of content dependence
while others bear the fundamental property of content independence. What is the
content of a reason, other than the fact that constitutes it, or that fact’s propositional
content? How could any reason be independent of that? And what would we add
to the claim that [r] is a reason for someone to 𝜑 by making the further claim that
that reason is dependent upon or independent of r? It is not clear that such a claim
would even make sense.
Most of those who claim content independence for legal reasons do not take the
content in question to be the content of the reason per se but rather the thing that
the reason is a reason to do. Thus, for some reason to𝜑, the content of that reason is
𝜑, or 𝜑-ing.17 It is this that Markwick has in mind when he argues that legal reasons
are not distinctively content independent. As I shall now argue, I think Markwick
is correct in this view but also partly misled by his argument, so that he rejects the
notion of the content independence of legal reasons altogether, as uninteresting or
uninformative. I do think legal reasons are not distinctively content independent, but
I do not think the notion is therefore uninteresting or uninformative. Rather, I think
that by better understanding the sense in which legal reasons are often claimed to be
content independent, and by seeing how such reasons are not so unlike other kinds
of normative reasons, we can better see how we might have reasons to obey the law
because it is the law.
In one paper, Markwick considers the following candidate condition for content in-
dependence of reasons:
If 𝜑-ing’s F-ness is a reason to 𝜑, this reason is content independent if
and only if for any other act-type µ, there would be a reason to µ if F
were a property of µ-ing.18
17Strictly speaking, it thus seems both more accurate and clearer to refer to 𝜑 as the object of S’s
reason to 𝜑 rather than its content, but it is probably too late to correct that particular error.
18Markwick, “Law and Content-Independent Reasons,” 582. In this paper and in “Independent of
Content,” Markwick often uses the phrase “a reason” to 𝜑 to mean sufficient or decisive reason to
𝜑. As I shall argue, however, it is much easier to argue that the law does not in all cases provide, on
its own, sufficient reason to do as it demands, than to argue that it does not provide a reason, or any
reasons, to so-act. We should consider the latter claim about reasons first, and only then move on to
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We can restate this condition briefly as the claim that a reason to act is content
independent just in case the reason is given by some property of the act such that,
if another act had that property, it would also provide a reason to so-act.
This seems, at first glance, like a good account of content independence. If some act
has the property of being required by the law, for instance, and if having this property
provides a reason to so-act, then there will be a like reason to do any other act that
also has the property of being required by the law. The reason given by the fact
that an act is required by the law, then, would appear to be a content-independent
reason.
Markwick points out, however, that this condition seems to capture toomany reason
types. Many acts are morally required, for example, and thus share the property of
being required by morality. The reasons given by the fact that these acts are morally
required thereby meet the condition above for content independence. And yet moral
reasons are not typically taken to be content independent. They are, rather, com-
monly taken to be content dependent. We can also ask, if moral reasons are content
independent, then which reasons are content dependent? The same point could be
made about several other properties typically not thought to confer content indepen-
dence upon the reasons they provide. Markwick gives two examples: the property
of causing unnecessary suffering and the property of maximizing utility. Take the
property of causing unnecessary suffering. That an act bears this property is a rea-
son not to do it and would be a reason not to do any other act bearing this property.
Such a reason would thus meet the condition above for content independence. Yet
such a reason, as Markwick notes, is commonly taken to be a clear example of a
content-dependent reason. Or take the property of maximizing utility. According to
act utilitarianism, an act is required if and only if it maximizes utility, no matter any
other features of the act (e.g., that doing it would break some promise, violate some
people’s rights, etc.). In other words, we might say, all and only utility-maximizing
acts are required, regardless of their content. Yet surely, Markwick claims, no act util-
itarian would claim that all such acts are required by content-independent reasons.
For again, the question could be asked, if these reasons are content independent,
then which reasons are content dependent? The objection, in brief, is that the fact
that it is unclear which reasons might be content dependent casts doubt upon the
viability and usefulness of the distinction between content dependence and indepen-
dence, and further that it is “unclear how content independence is a property which
distinguishes legal reasons in particular from reasons in general.”19 If no reasons, or
few reasons, are content dependent, or if we cannot use the property to distinguish
stronger claims about sufficient and decisive reasons.
19Markwick, “Law and Content-Independent Reasons,” 592.
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legal reasons from reasons in general, we might urge along with Markwick that we
give up on talk of content independence as an important feature of legal reasons
altogether, as uninteresting or uninformative.
Part of the answer to Markwick’s challenge is to concede that content independence
is not a distinctive property of legal reasons but to maintain that, when we claim
of some reasons, including legal reasons, that they are content independent, we are
making a claim that is nevertheless both interesting and informative. This is because
to claim that
some property of an act gives us a reason to do that act, and gives this
reason the property of being content independent
is, in my view, to claim nothing more than that
this property of the act is normative, in the sense that an act’s having it
gives us a reason to do that act regardless of any other facts about the
act.
It is interesting and informative to claim of some reasons that they are content inde-
pendent simply because it is interesting and informative to claim of some properties
of acts that they are normative, in the sense that they give us reasons to do those
acts. It is both interesting, and would be highly informative if true, to claim that
an act’s maximizing utility gives us a reason to do that act, as the act utilitarian’s
main thesis claims. If we could truly make a similar claim of many other properties,
this too would be highly informative and interesting. Such properties include the
property of being loved by the gods, the property of being required by the king, the
property of being an act whose maxim everyone could will to be a universal law of
nature, and many others, including the property of being demanded by the law. It
would be informative and interesting if the property of being demanded by the law
were normative, in the sense that an act’s having this property provided a reason to
do that act whatever this act may be. This is why, even conceding that content inde-
pendence is not a distinctive feature of legal reasons, we may nevertheless claim that
it would be interesting and informative if some legal reasons bore that property.20
20An anonymous reviewer points out that Markwick’s challenge might be thought to be directed at
a straw man, in light of Rawls’s famous distinction between the justification of a practice, following the
rule-utilitarian maxim, and the justification of an act falling under a practice, following the act-utilitarian
maxim. (See Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules.”) On Rawls’s view, legal reasons pertain principally to
the justification of practices and should therefore be construed as rule-utilitarian in nature, rendering
Markwick’s act-utilitarian examples inapt. I take the point to be friendly: if the answer to the question
(say) “ought I to obey my promise to𝜑?” should be given in terms of my reasons to obey my promises
rather than my reasons to 𝜑, then there is a clear element of content independence to those reasons.
If my legal reasons are generally of this nature, then the same will be true of them. That this charac-
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It may seem, I should acknowledge now, that I have already conceded too much. If
content independence is not a distinctive property of legal reasons, or if it is just
another way of making the obvious claim that some reasons are given by normative
properties of acts, then it may be hard to believe that I am indeed making a claim
that is interesting or informative. But an important part of my thesis is that legal
reasons are not as unlike other normative reasons as is commonly believed, and that
when we claim that legal reasons are content independent, we are (at least) tacitly
committing ourselves to this conclusion. Furthermore, I believe that understanding
this can help to make sense of the ways in which the law may in fact be a source of
genuinely normative reasons for action, such that we may truly claim that we have
reasons to obey the law because it is the law.
To see how this is so, it will help now to more fully explain my view of content
independence. On my view, we should understand claims of content independence
as grounding claims.21 When we claim that some fact [p] grounds another fact [q],
we can equivalently claim that:
[p] makes [q] true, or makes it the case that q;
[q] is true, or holds, in virtue of [p];
[q] depends on [p];
[q] holds because of [p].
The grounding relation is not, it is worth emphasizing, a causal relation, nor the
supervenience relation, nor is it the same as specifying the necessary conditions
for some fact to hold—though instances of these other relations may sometimes
coincide with instances of the grounding relation. It is, rather, the relation of one
fact’s making the case another fact and thereby non-causally explaining that fact. It
is, appropriately to the current discussion, a dependency relation.
teristic may be shared by legal reasons and other rule-utilitarian reasons—and especially if we think
the character of morality in general is rule-utilitarian (or rule-consequentialist) in nature—would not,
on my view, show the property of content independence to be uninteresting or uninformative with
respect to our reasons to obey the law.
The same reviewer notes that on Rawls’s view, asking about the justification of a practice introduces
an important opacity regarding the justification of acts falling under that practice, at least when those
acts are constituted by the practice. The thought is that (for instance) if I have promised to 𝜑, the
fact that I ought to obey my promises renders inappropriate further inquiry regarding the question of
whether I ought to𝜑. I take the view I propose to be compatible with various thoughts about “opaque”
or “excluded” reasons, a point I discuss extensively in section 3(b).
21See inter alia Berker, “The Unity of Grounding”; Fine, “Guide to Ground”; Rosen, “Metaphysical
Dependence.”
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The relation, though difficult to define, is very familiar in normative theorizing, as
when, for example,
1. Locke writes that “…this original Law of Nature for the beginning of Property,
in what was before common, still takes place; and by vertue thereof, what
Fish any one catches in the Ocean, that great and still remaining Common of
Mankind…is by the Labour that removes it out of that common state Nature
left it in, made his Property who takes that pains about it”;22 or when
2. Ross asks “Whatmakes acts right?” and answers that “the ground of the actual
rightness of [an] act is that, of all acts possible for the agent in the circum-
stances, it is that whose prima facie rightness in the respects in which it is
prima facie right most outweighs its prima facie wrongness in any respects in
which it is prima facie wrong”;23 or when
3. Rawls writes that the principles generated in the original position “must hold
for everyone in virtue of their being moral persons;”24 or when he writes that
the basis of equality lies in “the features of human beings in virtue of which
they are to be treated in accordance with the principles of justice”;25 or when
4. Cohen discusses the “Pareto claim” that “inequality is indeed just when and
because it has the particular consequence that it causes everyone to be better
off”;26 or when
5. Some people claim that a person deserves some treatment because of this per-
son’s prior acts or bad character.
The grounding relation is normatively indispensable; there are very many other such
examples all around us.27
The claim that legal reasons are content independent is a claim about which features
of the law can make it the case that we have reasons to do as it demands. When we
consider the claim that we ought to obey the law because it is the law, the “because”
22Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ch. 5, §29, my emphasis.
23Ross, The Right and the Good, 46, my emphasis on “makes.”
24Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 114, my emphasis.
25Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 441, my emphasis.
26Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, 89, my emphasis.
27I have given only a few easy examples. A search of works in moral and political philosophy for
the terms “in virtue of,” “makes it the case that,” and “when and because” will give a sense of just
how often the normative grounding relation is appealed to. Nor is this a distinctively contemporary or
evenmodern phenomenon. When Plato’s Euthyphro asks whether acts are pious because the gods love
them, or loved by the gods because they are pious, he is asking a question about normative grounding.
(In “No Church in theWild,” Jay-Z asks the same question poetically: “Is Pious pious ’cause God loves
pious?” He too is asking a question about grounding.)
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is the because of grounding. When we consider the claim that it is in virtue of being
against the law that some act is wrong, rather than due to the “merits of the act itself,”
we are considering the claim that some feature of the law that is not also a feature
of the act demanded by the law is what makes the act wrongful, or what grounds its
wrongness.
Put most simply, the claim is that:
[The law demands that S 𝜑] grounds [S has a reason to 𝜑].
However, to claim just that [The law demands that S 𝜑] grounds [S has a reason to
𝜑] may be misleading, for demands do not by themselves ground reasons for action.
Rather, it is only in combination with the facts that legitimate those demands that
they may do this. If the law’s demands can ground reasons for action, there must
be some further feature of the law that gives its demands this force.
In many cases, it is worth noting, a legitimate demand may play no part at all in
grounding a reason for action. This may be easiest to see by considering a basic
case of promising. Suppose I have made you a promise that I will 𝜑, and that you
subsequently demand that I fulfill my promise. We could not then claim that
[You demand that I fulfill my promise to 𝜑] grounds [I have a reason
to 𝜑]
because it is not your demand butmy promise which grounds the obligation: I would
have a reason to fulfill my promise regardless of whether you demanded that I do so
or not. More fully, it is in virtue of my having made a promise to you both that you
may make a genuinely normative demand of me that I fulfill my promise and that I
have a reason to do so.
By contrast, some demands may seem to by themselves ground reasons for action.
Certain demands by those we love, for example, or to whom we otherwise have
special obligations, may seem to be clear cases of this kind. If your child demands
love and attention, for instance, it may seem that
[Your child demands love and attention] grounds [You have a reason to
give your child love and attention].
But even in this case, it would be better to claim that your child’s demand together
with your special obligations to your child ground your reason for action. To claim
only that your child’s demand grounds your reason for action would be misleading,
and to claim that your child’s demand by itself grounds your reason for action would
be false.
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Similar remarks apply to the law’s demands on us. In order to make plausible the
claim that the law’s demands ground reasons for action, we need to identify some
property or properties of the law in virtue of which its demands are genuinely nor-
mative. In other words, it is only in virtue of some normative property or properties
of the law together with the fact that the law makes specific demands of us that we
may come to have reasons to do as it demands. We should therefore consider the
revised claim that:
[The law has some properties {P}] and [The law demands that S 𝜑]
together ground [S has a reason to 𝜑].
Note that we are now discussing the possibility of several facts together grounding a
single fact. To understand this, it may help to make explicit my assumption that not
all grounding relations between one fact and another are relations of full grounding;
many are relations of partial grounding. One fact [p] partially grounds another [q]
when [p] helps make [q] true, or helps make it the case that [q], or when [q] holds
partly in virtue of, or partly because of, [p]. The fact that S has a reason to 𝜑, for
example, would partially ground the fact that S ought to 𝜑, by contributing to the set
of reasons for S to 𝜑. The set of reasons such that S has more reason to 𝜑 than to
do any alternative act fully ground the fact that S has decisive reason to 𝜑, by fully
making it the case that S ought to 𝜑.28 The claim I wish to make may indeed be
more fully stated as the claim that:
Each of the facts [The law has some properties {P}] and [The law de-
mands that S 𝜑] partially ground, and together fully ground, [S has a
reason to 𝜑].29
This claim about the content independence of legal reasons can be made in other,
equivalent ways. The grounding claim made by claims of content independence of
the law is also a claim about what does not fully ground a person’s reason for action.
Namely, it is the claim that the fact that a law demands that S 𝜑, and indeed all facts
about 𝜑-ing, do not fully ground the reason given by the law for S to 𝜑. Or in other
28There are also many non-normative examples of the distinction between full and partial grounding,
which may be clearer: [The apple is golden and delicious] is fully grounded by [The apple is golden]
and [The apple is delicious] together, and partially grounded by each of those facts separately.
29One of the law’s properties is of course that it demands that S𝜑, and another is, presumably, that
it demands that a certain set of people including but not solely consisting of S 𝜑. The first would
merely repeat [The law demands that S 𝜑], since to make this claim is to make the claim that the
law has the property of demanding that S 𝜑, so would not in that case constitute additional partial
grounding for [S has a reason to 𝜑]. As for the second, to claim that the wider [The law demands
that a set of people {S, …} 𝜑] together with its instantiation [The law demands that S 𝜑] grounds (if
indeed it does ground) [S has a reason to 𝜑] is not importantly different from simply claiming that
the instantiation alone can do this work.
13
words, the legal reason for S to 𝜑 is independent of facts about 𝜑-ing, where “inde-
pendent” is to be understood as a negative grounding claim. The positive grounding
claim is that when S has a content-independent reason to obey the law’s demand
that S 𝜑, this reason is at least partially grounded by some fact or facts about the law
that are not also facts about 𝜑-ing. These facts are about the normative properties of
the law in general, as distinct from any particular action the law requires or forbids.
Understanding the claim that legal reasons provide content-independent reasons
for action as a claim about grounding helps make sense of a number of cases in
which, intuitively, it may be unclear whether the law provides a genuinely normative,
content-independent moral reason to do as it demands. Imagine, for instance, a
society in which the law is merely a codification of morality, such as that of the
Israelite tribe under Moses: Moses’s tablets, we can imagine, were a codification of
the independently normative moral truths given to the Israelites by God. We might
then imagine one Israelite appealing to another, more murderously inclined Israelite
that the tablets forbid killing. “You must not kill, because it is against the law,” the
one might say. What should we make of the first Israelite’s appeal to the second?
Let us grant that the second Israelite in fact has a reason not to kill. If the first
Israelite’s appeal is meant to make a claim about what grounds the second Israelite’s
reason, then that claim is false, since the fact that “THOU SHALT NOT KILL” is
written on Moses’s tablets certainly does not ground the second Israelite’s reason
not to kill—it is rather the moral prohibition on killing, given to the Israelites by God
and recorded by Moses on the tablets, that does this. Just as the wind’s happening
to spell out “THOU SHALT NOT KILL” in the sand would not itself be a reason not
to kill, etchings of God’s moral law in stone would not themselves provide reasons
for action. Only speaking loosely may we claim that an act’s being prohibited by
Moses’s tablets is a reason for the Israelites not to do it, and when we make such a
claim, it must be either false or else, more charitably, be a shorthand way of making
themore accurate claim that the act is prohibited by God. This is because, in the case
we are imagining, God’s prohibition is genuinely normative, whereas being codified
on Moses’s tablets, or being written by the wind in the sand, is not.
More generally, when demanding that for each morally required act, S do that act,
we would make a mistake by claiming that
[The law codifies morality] and [The law demands that S 𝜑] together
ground [S has a reason to 𝜑].
For it would be in virtue of 𝜑-ing’s being morally required, rather than in virtue of
the law’s demanding or codifying that S 𝜑, that S has a reason to 𝜑. These further
facts about the law would add nothing to the normative grounds for S’s𝜑-ing, which
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is to say would not help to make it the case that S has a reason to 𝜑. In the same way,
if I told you truly that you ought morally to do some act, and even if I always told you
truly what the thing was you ought to do, it would be in virtue of this act’s being a
moral requirement, rather than in virtue of my telling you so, that you ought to do
it. In this way, the law cannot be said to provide content-independent reasons for
action in cases in which it is merely a codification of more fundamental normative
facts.
Similarly, we can, by understanding content independence as an idea about norma-
tive grounding, better understand the sense in which Markwick rightly claims that
legal reasons are not distinctively content independent. The claim that legal reasons
are content independent is no more than the claim that some legal property of these
reasons, such as (say) that it was passed by a democratic assembly, or that it solves
some coordination problem—rather than something about what it is these legal rea-
sons are reasons to do—is what makes it the case that they are genuinely normative
for those to whom they apply; just as, according to one widely held view, moral
reasons are made genuinely normative not by facts about what they are reasons to
do but by facts about morality, such as that the act for which the reason counts in
favor would maximize utility, or is an act that no one could reasonably reject, or is
an act that is in conformity with a maxim that could be willed to be a universal law,
and so on. But we can also in this way understand why the further worry that, by
failing to be distinctive, the content independence of legal reasons may be uninfor-
mative or uninteresting, is misplaced. For the claim that legal reasons are content
independent is the important and substantive claim that the law, like morality, can
be a source of genuinely normative moral reasons for action, rather than merely a
way of calling attention to reasons whose real normative force lies elsewhere.
3. Objections
It is worth pausing now to consider some objections against the view I have proposed.
First, I will consider several versions of the objection that the view fails on its own
terms, since all moral reasons are ultimately grounded in facts about morality rather
than the law. By explaining how this objection fails, the distinctive character of the
grounding view of content independence will become clearer. Second, I will address
the objection that by analyzing content independence in terms of the grounds of rea-
sons to obey the law, I have lost (or worse, am unable to accommodate) a distinctive
and important feature of our reasons to obey the law, namely, the opacity of such
reasons to those subject to them. In considering these objections, I will compare my
view with well-known views represented by Hart, Raz, and Rawls.
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(a) Internal Objections
To begin, it may be objected that any moral force the law has must be had in virtue
of some prior moral facts, and that in view of this, no obligation to do as the law
demands may be said to hold in virtue of facts about the law. This objection may
take two forms. On the first, the complaint is that the law is, like Moses’s tablets, a
mere codification of some other normative facts, and that thus we may not properly
claim that it is the law which grounds our reasons to do as it demands.
To answer this first version of the objection, it is important to understand the sense
in which one fact’s grounding another provides a non-causal explanation for the sec-
ond fact. [The apple is golden] and [The apple is delicious] together ground and
thereby explain [The apple is golden and delicious]. Similarly, according to act utili-
tarians, the claim that [The act would maximize utility] grounds and thereby explains
[The act is required]. By contrast, if we imagine some person who always speaks
truly, [This person says that the apple is golden and delicious]would not ground [The
apple is golden and delicious], because this person’s claim, though true, would not
explain [This apple is golden and delicious]. Nor would, for the act utilitarian, [This
person says that the act is required] ground or explain [The act is required]. To
explain in this non-causal way seems to be part of what it is to ground.
Now compare two similar cases. In the first, suppose that some king’s dictates are
independently normatively binding on his subjects, and suppose further that those
dictates are published in a book of codes. In one sense, we could plausibly claim that
[This act is prohibited by the codebook] grounds [This act must not be done], but
only insofar as [This act is prohibited by the codebook] refers not to the physical
book but to the abstract collection of dictates recorded there, so that [This act is
prohibited by the codebook] is a shorthand for [This act is prohibited by the king’s
dictates]. This is like the way in which we can only truly claim that an act’s being
prohibited by Moses’s tablets grounds our reasons not to do this act if we more fully
mean that it is God’s prohibition, which the tablets record, that grounds our reason
not to do this act. In this way, there is an important sense in which we may properly
say that an act’s being prohibited by the codebook non-causally explains the fact that
we must not do this act.
In the second case, suppose that some unofficial observer privately records the king’s
dictates in a notebook. In contrast with the first case, we could not then plausibly
claim that [This act is prohibited by the notebook] grounds [This act must not be
done], because the notebook is a mere private record of the king’s dictates, and
[This act is prohibited by the notebook] could not plausibly be a shorthand for the
claim that the act is prohibited by the king. It is more like the wind writing “THOU
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SHALT NOT KILL” in the sand, or like, when I truly tell you that you ought not to do
some act, it is not my telling you so that explains the fact that you ought not to do it.
There is no sense in which being prohibited by the notebook non-causally explains
the fact that some act must not be done.
When we claim that
[The law has some properties {P}] and [The law demands that S 𝜑]
together ground [S has a reason to 𝜑]
we are, as in the first case, making a non-causal explanatory claim. There will be
further facts which ground the fact that the law has such properties, as well as, more
pertinently, further facts about what makes those properties give the law normative
force. If there are such properties of the law, however, which together with its de-
mands ground reasons for us to obey it, we may properly say that those facts ground
reasons for action, and we may properly refer to such reasons as reasons to obey the
law because it is the law.
A second version of this objection argues that, when we claim that some properties
of the law help ground a reason for us to do as it demands, we ought instead to claim
that it is those properties, or whatever grounds them, that ground our reasons to do
as the law demands, rather than the law itself. If some facts about the democratic
origins of a law, for instance, are what make it the case that we have a reason to do as
it demands, then, according to this objection, we should say that it is those origins,
rather than the law itself, which give us such a reason. We should, on this objection,
follow the normative grounding “all the way back,” and then make any grounding
claims in terms of those fundamental normative grounds.
One answer to this objection is to agree that we may often be able to make ground-
ing claims in terms of other, more fundamental grounds by following the chain of
grounding “back,” but to deny that such a move is always better. Indeed, it may on
many occasions be worse to do this. When claiming that
[The apple is golden] and [The apple is delicious] together ground [The
apple is golden and delicious]
it may not help, or it may be unnecessary, to reformulate the claim in terms of
the very many further facts which ground [The apple is golden] and [The apple
is delicious] separately. The same may be said of the facts that ground our reasons
to obey the law.
Another answer to this objection is to remark that, even if some property of the law,
such as its democratic origins, is what helps make it the case that we have a reason
to do as the law demands, the fact that the law has such a property could not on its
17
own, or fully, ground such a reason. In other words, although we might make the
specific claim that
[The law’s origins are democratic] partially grounds [S has a reason to
𝜑],
it would be misleading to claim simply that [The law’s origins are democratic]
grounds [S has a reason to 𝜑] because it is not only the fact that the law has this
property, but also the fact that the law demands that S 𝜑—that is, S as a specific sub-
ject and 𝜑 as a specific act—which together fully ground the fact that S has a reason
to 𝜑. Alternatively, though we might, in the case we are imagining, truly claim that
[The law’s origins are democratic] fully grounds [Subjects of the law
have a reason to obey the law],
we would, in order to make a specific claim about what grounds S’s reason to 𝜑,
need to claim that
[The law’s origins are democratic] and [The law demands that S 𝜑]
together ground [S has a reason to 𝜑].
We could not then, as this version of the objection urges, make the grounding claim
only in terms of some fact or set of facts about the law’s properties. And we should
therefore not say that it is the law’s origins, rather than the law itself, which give us
a reason to do as it demands.
It should be said too that when considering which properties {P} may help ground
our reasons to do as the law demands, not just any properties will do. For, as I have
argued, the property that the law codifies morality could not partly ground a reason
for action. The properties in question must be, rather, distinctive properties of the law
in order to be able to help ground a reason to obey the law, in the way that, for
example, we might call some law’s democratic origin, or its being part of a certain
kind of fair system of social cooperation, or its being issued by a law-giving body
whose authority was consented to, such distinctive properties.30 While we could
make the grounding claim only in these terms, we could also usefully summarize
this grounding claim as a claim about why we have reasons to obey the law because
it is the law. In other words, we may call the reasons grounded in these ways legal
reasons, and we may claim that learning we have such reasons tells us something
30We can also see in this way how some putatively or apparently normative properties of the law
might fail to be truly normative. If a democratic lawmaking process, and the laws it produces, are
justified because those laws are more likely to accurately reflect underlying moral demands, this may
ground a reason to believe that we ought to do as the law demands, but it could not itself ground a
further reason to so-act.
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important about the normativity of the law rather than merely about other familiar
sources of normativity. If we learn that democratic lawmaking, or legal fair play, or
consent to the law can help ground such reasons, we learn something not only about
the normativity of democracy, fairness, or consent, but about the moral force of the
law itself.
(b) External Objections
We can turn next to a different kind of objection, which takes issue not with what is
entailed by the view proposed here but with what it may seem to lack. In classic dis-
cussions of the idea, content independence is typically mentioned in the same breath
as another property, which Hart calls “peremptoriness,” Raz calls “preemptiveness,”
and which Rawls, though he does not give it a name, seems to have had in mind in
discussing what he calls “rules of practice.”31 The thought uniting these discussions
(which I will consider in more detail shortly) is that content-independent reasons
to obey the law often render certain other considerations opaque to those subject to
them—normally, the underlying considerations that justify such reasons, or other
reasons for or against the thing the reason is a reason to do—by excluding those
considerations from a subject’s practical deliberation. By contrast, I have suggested
that we may understand the question about the law’s force simply in terms of its dis-
tinctive normative properties, and that we may answer that question, or begin to, by
thinking about the reasons grounded by those properties. This suggests a picture of
the relationship between subjects and the law that is transparent with respect to the
grounds and strength of the law’s normative force. It may thus be objected that the
view proposed here is incompatible with the law’s opacity.32
As before, we can helpfully distinguish several more precise versions of this objec-
tion. The first takes as its inspiration Hart and Raz’s famous discussions of authori-
tative reasons, which they argue are both content independent and opaque.
Hart writes (endorsing a view he attributes to Hobbes) that
[a] commander characteristically intends his hearer to take the com-
mander’s will instead of his own as a guide to action and so to take it
in place of any deliberation or reasoning of his own: the expression of a
commander’s will that an act be done is intended to preclude or cut off
31The notions are distinct, though they are similar enough to mention as a group. I will discuss
some of the differences between them below. See Hart, Essays on Bentham, ch. 10; Raz, The Morality of
Freedom, chs. 2–3; Raz, Practical Reason and Norms; and Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules.”
32I thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to address this point, and for suggesting the
term “opacity.”
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any independent deliberation by the hearer of the merits pro and con
of doing the act.33
He calls authoritative reasons that succeed in cutting off deliberation in this way
“peremptory.”
Raz, discussing the same topic, writes:
One thesis I am arguing for claims that authoritative reasons are pre-
emptive: the fact that an authority requires performance of an action
is a reason for its performance which is not to be added to all other
relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but should exclude and
take the place of some of them.34
Following these thoughts, it might be objected that opacity and content indepen-
dence are analytically tied, and that the view I have proposed in this paper cannot
accommodate this. For I have suggested that, in asking whether we have reasons to
obey the law, we should look to the various distinctive normative properties of the
law as grounds of such reasons, whereas opacity seems to require that we—in our
role as subjects of the law—refrain from precisely this kind of inquiry.
There are several answers to Hart and Raz’s challenge. It is important to note, first,
that content independence and opacity are not analytically tied tout court, in the sense
that neither is a property of or entails the other, nor are they necessarily mutually
coextensive.35 That this is so is clear enough as a matter of reflection, I think, but
can also easily be seen by considering the case of threats. Threats are archetypally
content independent—one’s reason to do as a threatener demands (if one has such
reason) arises in virtue of the threat rather than in virtue of what it is demanded
that one do—yet they are not also opaque. One thought, already mentioned, is
that the grounds of opaque reasons are not transparent (or not meant to be trans-
parent) to those to whom they apply. But of course, the transparency of the facts
which ground a threat’s normative force—viz., the badness of the threatened conse-
quences together with the conditional assurance that they will be brought about—is
crucial to the threat’s functioning. Another thought, following Hart and Raz, is that
opaque reasons replace or exclude from consideration other reasons bearing on the
33Hart, Essays on Bentham, 253.
34Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 47, emphasis removed from the original.
35Neither Hart nor Raz appear to take opacity and content independence to be analytically linked in
this sense. Hart discusses what he calls the “peremptory character” of authoritative reasons separately
and before discussing their content independence. See Hart, Essays on Bentham, 254. Raz discusses
content independence and “preemption” in different chapters entirely of The Morality of Freedom; and
the two are nowhere discussed together in his major work on exclusionary reasons, Practical Reason
and Norms.
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act in question. Yet threats do no such thing. Indeed, to weigh the reason given by
the threat together with all of one’s other reasons for and against doing the thing
demanded seems precisely what is called for in such cases. Threats, then, are not
plausibly sources of opaque reasons, though they are clearly content independent.
So it cannot be that the two properties do not come apart.
It may be, however, that in the domain of interest, content independence and opacity
always come together. This leads to a second point. For both Hart and Raz, opac-
ity and content independence are discussed as part of their analyses of authoritative
reasons. Moreover, while content independence is acknowledged to be a property of
many reason types, the possession of the further property of opacity is what is said
to be a distinctive characteristic of authoritative reasons. I shall consider in a moment
whether anything I have said is incompatible with this conception of authoritative
reasons. But before that, it is worth noting that I have not endeavored in this paper
to offer an account of the authority of law, only to ask whether it provides content-
independent moral reasons to do as it demands.36 Whether opacity is a feature of
what it is for a reason to be authoritative, as Hart and Raz suggest, is not a matter
we should expect our more modest question to pertain to.
This narrow point conceals a broader one. If the arguments in the remainder of
this paper are correct, then we may conclude that the law often provides content-
independent moral reasons to do as it demands, and moreover that these reasons
often amount to obligations. This conclusion alone undermines a central strand of
philosophical anarchism. The fact that we may reach this conclusion without asking
the further question of whether the law, in providing these reasons, does so author-
itatively—as well as what this means, and what it adds—is of theoretical interest in
itself. We should take care to distinguish, in thinking about the normativity of the
law, the question of whether it has reason-giving moral force from the question of
whether it is authoritative. It is a virtue of the approach taken here that it allows us
to see the space between these two questions.
The challenge that remains is that the view proposed in this paper is incompatible
with the opacity of authoritative reasons to obey the law. If Hart or Raz is correct
about the character of the authority of the law, and if we do indeed have authoritative
reasons to obey the law, then this incompatibility would count as a strike against
this paper’s main claims. I believe, however, that the view of content independence
proposed here is compatible with Hart and Raz’s notions of opacity. To see this, it
will help to describe more precisely their views.
36The topic of the law’s authority is too large and difficult a topic to enter into in this already lengthy
discussion. I take up the question of the law’s authority in further work. See “Authority as a Power to
Demand” in my “Essays at the Limits of the Law.”
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For Raz, an authoritative reason is really two reasons: a “first order” reason for ac-
tion as well as an “exclusionary reason,” which is a species of “second order reason”:
A second order reason is any reason to act for a reason or to refrain from
acting for a reason. An exclusionary reason is a second order reason to
refrain from acting for some reason.37
An authoritative reason to 𝜑 is thus, on this view, both a first order reason to 𝜑
as well as a second order reason to refrain from acting for other reasons favoring
or disfavoring 𝜑-ing. This structure is familiar, Raz claims, from promises, which
also generate exclusionary reasons. By way of illustration (to borrow one of Raz’s
examples), if one has promised to consider only one’s child’s interests in decisions
about the child’s schooling, then one has an exclusionary reason not to make such
decisions for (among other things) self-interested reasons, such as that it would
require a career sacrifice, mean fewer vacations, require substantial time driving
to and from the campus, and so on. These reasons are not to be considered in
deliberation about how to best educate the child.
Though he does not say so in exactly these terms, what Hart has in mind is some-
thing similar. Here he is again:
[T]he expression of a commander’s will that an act be done is intended
to preclude or cut off any independent deliberation by the hearer of the
merits pro and con of doing the act.38
Insofar as Hart is making a claim about the character of authoritative reasons (rather
than the mental states of those issuing commands), we should read him as claiming
that in addition to being a reason to 𝜑, an authoritative reason also has the effect of
prohibiting further deliberation about whether to 𝜑. A strong reading of this prohi-
bition would preclude any contemplation of the merits of 𝜑-ing;39 a weak reading
would only preclude such considerations from figuring in deliberation about whether
to 𝜑. On either reading, Hart is suggesting, like Raz, that authoritative reasons also
regulate a subject’s proper consideration of the various other reasons that may favor
or disfavor 𝜑-ing, and so we may treat both as holding the view that authoritative
reasons entail exclusionary reasons.
Hart and Raz’s claims are thus about the scope of reasons for which it is appropriate
37Raz, “Reasons for Action, Decisions and Norms,” 487. The nature of second order reasons is a
point of controversy. See Piller, “Kinds of Practical Reasons”; Whiting, “Against Second-Order Rea-
sons”; and Scanlon, “Reason and Value.” These are recent discussions, though as Raz notes in the
postscript to Practical Reason and Norms, the history of this debate goes back at least four decades.
38Hart, Essays on Bentham, 253.
39Raz attributes the strong reading to Hart. See Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 39.
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for subjects to 𝜑 when the law authoritatively demands that they 𝜑, as a matter of
practical deliberation. It is not about the considerations that in fact count in favor of
𝜑-ing, nor is it about the further facts that ground the law’s authority in that case.
It might therefore be the case both that (as I have claimed)
1. [The law has some properties {P}] and [The law demands that S 𝜑] together
ground [S has a reason to 𝜑],
and that (as Hart and Raz claim)
2. The reason for which S should 𝜑 is [The law demands that S 𝜑] together with
[The law is authoritative].
There is no incompatibility here. (1) is about the grounds of subjects’ reasons to
obey the law, and (2) is about the reasons for which subjects should act when they
consider whether to do as the law demands. If it is also true (though it might not
be) that the properties of the law {P} are those that make the law authoritative, then
(1) will help explain (2). (Subjects must also deliberate regarding whether a reason
is authoritative, in order to know whether (2) applies to them; (1) may in that case
help them to do so.) If not, then the reasons grounded by those properties will be
superfluous to a subject’s deliberation whether to 𝜑. In either case, if these theories
about authority are correct, there is a deliberative opacity between (1) and (2) but
no conflict. Again, it is a virtue of the approach taken here that it allows us to clearly
see this relationship.
As I said, there is another version of this objection. This objection is deeper, because
according to it, content independence and opacity emerge as structural or logical
consequences of the law as a rule-governed practice, such that moral reasons to
obey the law because it is the law must be opaque.40 A version of this objection is
suggested by Rawls, who argues that “the rules of practices are logically prior to
particular cases,” which is to say that
given any rule which specifies a form of action (a move), a particular
action which would be taken as falling under this rule given that there
is the practice would not be described as that sort of action unless there
was the practice. In the case of actions specified by practices it is logi-
cally impossible to perform them outside the stage-setting provided by
those practices, for unless there is the practice, and unless the requisite
proprieties are fulfilled, whatever one does, whatever movements one
40Note that this objection does not claim opacity is a property of content independence generally,
just that the two are coextensive in the domain of reasons to obey the law, and other structurally
similar domains, in virtue of the structure of those domains.
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makes, will fail to count as a form of action which the practice specifies.
What one does will be described in some other way.41
As an example, Rawls offers the rules of baseball. In baseball, to record three strikes
at bat just is to strike out, and the act of “recording a strike,” as well as the states
of being “at bat,” “out,” and so on are defined by the rules of baseball. Thus, the
question
Shall I stay at bat after my third strike?
can only be answered, and an answer can only be justified, by reference to the rules
of baseball. After a third strike, one has struck out; and once one has struck out,
one is no longer to be at bat. This is true even though in another frame of mind, we
might wonder whether the rules of baseball are the best rules, should be amended,
and so on. As a player, Rawls argues, such considerations simply do not bear on the
question of what to do, and so are excluded from a player’s deliberation about how
to act.
Since this question is about one of the many rules of baseball, the same might be
thought true of the general question
Shall I obey the rules of baseball?
Likewise, the answer to this question might be thought to be given only by the fact
of whether one is playing baseball or not. If one is playing, the rules simply apply
to one, and further considerations are excluded. So while one might ask in the first
instance whether to play baseball or not, once one has decided to play, there is no
further question of whether to play as the rules demand. To play just is to have the
rules apply. The general question is thus necessarily answered in the affirmative.
This way of conceiving rules of practice renders the reasons given by them content
independent. An individual player is to take as her reason for (say) returning to
the dugout the fact that she is out, which is made true by the three strikes she has
had at bat. Both are made true by the rules of baseball, which might have defined
being “out” differently or which might have required something else of a player who
strikes out. Her reason to return to the dugout is thus grounded by the fact that the
rules apply to her together with the fact of what the rules require, rather than by
the independent merits of returning to the dugout or not. It is, in this way, content
independent.
Importantly, this form of content independence is also opaque with respect to the
underlying justification of the rules. This is because the normative properties of
41Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” 25, emphasis in the original.
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the rules which justify them—e.g., that they are most conducive to fun, competition,
fairness, and so on—do not also ground the fact that the player is out or the fact
that the rules apply to her.42 Those properties do not therefore ground the player’s
reason to return to the dugout. Since the normative properties of the rules do not
ground the player’s reason to obey them, the reason is therefore opaque with respect
to those properties, and they are excluded as reasons bearing on what she is to do.
It is easy to see, by analogy, how the same might be thought true of the law and
our reasons to do as it demands. For just as some acts and states are defined by the
practice of baseball, so too we might think that some acts and states are defined by
the law.43 Thus, perhaps the question
Shall I pay 𝑥 dollars to the tax collector?
can only be answered by reference to the law of the land, since the tax regime, the
office of the tax collector, and even the dollar and the very notion of tax are defined
by the law. Again, it might be thought that the tax law simply applies to one, such
that there is no intelligible question of whether to obey. (Or at least that this is
true insofar as the tax law applies to one.) And while there may be good reasons to
adopt this tax code or that one, such questions apply at the level of legislation and
regulation, not to an individual subject wondering whether to write a check for 𝑥
dollars to the revenue service.
Again, likewise, it might be thought that this question about taxes is just one in-
stance of the more general question
Shall I obey the law?
and that the interrogative form of this general question disguises the important truth
that the law simply applies to those subject to it. We are all playing, and the rules
apply to us all.
If this were true, then content independence would similarly be a structural property
of the way the law creates demands on its subjects, and the reasons for those subjects
to obey would be opaque with respect to the considerations that justify the law itself.
42This is slightly too quick. The same considerations that justify the rules may, depending on our
view, also play some part in grounding the fact that they apply to players. Even if they do, however,
variations in those considerations—e.g., just how conducive to fun this rule is—would affect a player’s
reason to obey only if they altered the fact of whether the rules applied or not, which presumably most
such considerations would not. The player’s reason to obey the rule, then, would remain opaque with
respect to those considerations.
43Rawls makes this point by offering the example of rules of punishment. I think the example of
taxes is an easier one, and so I shall proceed with it, but nothing is meant to hang on this choice. See
Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” 10–18.
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However, whatever conclusions we should draw from Rawls’s argument, it should
be clear that they cannot be these. We can intelligibly ask whether or not to obey
the law, or this law or that law, even when the acts we are considering whether or not
to do are defined by the law; and the mere fact of the law’s application to us cannot
settle that question. Indeed, we can see on reflection that precisely the same is true
of a player wondering whether to obey the rules of a game.
This is, first, because on Rawls’s analysis, a question of the form
Shall I stay at bat after my third strike?
and in the relevantly similar sense, so too the question
Shall I pay 𝑥 dollars to the tax collector?
is a question not about what to do but rather a question about what the rules are. They
are thus not particular instances of more general questions about whether to obey
the rules. To the contrary, that general question can still be asked, in both cases.44
Perhaps the player has reasons to break the rules by staying at bat after a third
strike—reasons from within the game, such as that it would beneficially delay the
game;45 or reasons fromwithout, such as that doing so would serve as some political
protest. Then the player may sensibly ask whether or not to obey that rule, as a way
of asking whether to continue within the practice. Likewise, those subject to the
law may sensibly ask whether or not to do as it demands. We can ask this question
from within the practice, and considerations from both within and outside of the
practice can bear on the answer. Since we are concerned here with the question of
whether to obey the law, not the question of what the law demands when it applies
to us, it is important that the former question is seen not to be opaque with regard
to reasons that come from outside the practice. It is, rather, transparent in precisely
the way I have been suggesting so far.
Second, Rawls himself suggests that questions about acts that are practice-defined
may be redescribed in other, non-practice-defined terms, or may inevitably entail
giving answers to such questions.46 Thus to answer the question
44Rawls recognizes this point when he writes that if one’s appeal to the rules is not accepted, “it’s
a sign that a different question is being raised as to whether one is justified in accepting the practice,
or in tolerating it.” See Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” 27.
45Whether strategic rule-breaking is an act within a practice or an abrogation of it is a vexed question
which I cannot enter into here. On this question with respect to Rawls and baseball, see Palmiter,
“Cheating, Gamesmanship, and the Concept of a Practice.” There is also a lively debate regarding this
question with respect to contracts and promises. See, e.g., Shiffrin, “The Divergence of Contract and
Promise.”
46Rawls again: A practice-dependent act “would not be described as that sort of action unless there
was the practice. …What one does will be described in some otherway.” See “Two Concepts of Rules,”
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Shall I stay at bat after my third strike?
might also be described as, or entail an answer to, the question
Shall I continue standing here, on this spot, now?
The latter question makes no necessary reference to practice-defined states or acts,
and so may be answered by reference to all of the reasons for and against continuing
to stand in that spot. (Perhaps you promised you would do so; perhaps you are being
threatened not to move; etc.) Importantly, the answer to this wider question may
supersede the answer to the first, since it includes in it the value of abiding by the
rules of the practice versus the disvalue of breaking them.
The point is easier to see when we consider certain questions of law. For Justice
Lemuel Shaw, to answer the question
Shall I order Thomas Sims returned to slavery in accordance with the
Fugitive Slave Act?
was also to answer the question
Shall I bring it about that Thomas Sims is re-enslaved?
The first question might have been decidable only by the standards of the law, but
to answer that question was at the same time to answer the second question, which
clearly involves wider moral considerations, including those concerning the value
of the law itself. (This is true, I think, even if the state of enslavement is taken to
be defined by a legal practice.) To argue that Shaw’s question was fully settled by
the law, or that the law simply applied to Shaw’s judicial act, is to ignore the clear
conflict between the demands of the statute and the requirements of morality.47
We can put the point generally. Systems of rules generate, for those subject to them,
content-independent reasons: insofar as one is aiming to act within a practice, one’s
reason to 𝜑 arises in virtue of the rules of the practice, rather than in virtue of facts
about 𝜑-ing as such. From within the practice, one’s reason to 𝜑 may be opaque.
But one can also ask whether the act required by the practice can be redescribed in
other terms, or whether to decide to do that act is also to decide to do some further
act. Wider considerations may bear on this further question, and the answer to it
may impinge on the answer to the first. The opacity of rule-given reasons, then, may
in this way be made transparent.
25, emphasis in the original.
47Shaw infamously ordered Sims returned to slavery. For details of the case, see Brown, “Thomas
Sims’s Case after 150 Years.”
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If I am right about these ways to answer Rawls’s challenge, then this version of the
objection fails as well. Even for practice-defined acts demanded by the law, we can
ask whether we ought to do them. This question is not opaque: it calls for us to
think about the various normative properties of the law that might give us reason
to obey or disobey. It also, in the manner I have been describing, remains content
independent: if we have reason to obey, it will be in virtue of those distinctive prop-
erties of the law, rather than in virtue of properties of the thing the law demands we
do.
4. Anarchism
Even if it may be claimed, as I have argued it may, that there could be genuinely
normative, content-independentmoral reasons for action given by the law, it remains
to be shown that such reasons do in fact exist (or, as I shall more modestly claim,
that it is plausible that such reasons exist). We can turn finally, then, to the question
of whether, and in what sense, we might truly claim about the law that it provides
such reasons.
Let us begin with the easier issue of in what sense we might truly make such claims.
As I noted at the beginning of this essay, it is telling that the “traditional question”
in the study of legal obligation, and indeed the name of the field itself, concerns not
reasons to obey the law but our obligation to do as it demands. We may restate this
traditional question of whether we are obligated to obey the law, because it is the law,
as the “obligation question”:
Does the law provide genuinely normative, content-independent, and
normally decisive moral reasons to do as it demands?48
In order to answer Yes to this question, we would need to identify some property
or properties of the law which, together with the law’s demanding that we act, fully
ground our having normally decisive moral reasons to so-act.
I do not doubt that historically, some have thought it plausible to provide an affir-
mative answer to the obligation question and to identify such properties. We might,
for instance, agree with the First Vatican Council that
(A) the Pope is the earthly representative of God and is preserved from the possi-
bility of error,
48As explained in section 1, I use “normally decisive reason” as a moderately ecumenical analysis of
the concept of obligation.
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(B) the law as handed down by the Pope (the “Pope’s law”) is normatively binding,
in the sense that we each have decisive reason to do as it demands,
and that therefore
(C) the Pope’s law provides each of us with genuinely normative, content-
independent, and decisive moral reason to do as it demands.49
Alternatively, as in an earlier example, we might hold a similar view about the obli-
gation of subjects to obey the laws handed down to them by monarchs, in view of
the natural right of kings and queens. Such a right might, like the Pope’s, or as on
Filmer’s view, be grounded in divine right or revelation, or else, as on the common
reading of Hobbes, be grounded in the necessary covenant of each to every other in
order to gain protection from the war of all against all.
Such defenses of the affirmative answer to the obligation question do not, however,
strike me as plausible, nor do I suppose they strike many as plausible today. And
yet, despite this, writers persist in treating the obligation question as the one that
demands an answer.50 This insistence, unsurprisingly, has led many to answer No,
and instead to endorse some version of philosophical anarchism. For if we must
endorse either the view that the law always gives us genuinely normative, content-
independent, and normally decisive moral reasons to do as it demands, or the view
that it gives us no reasons at all, the anarchist’s choice is clearly the best one. Faced
with such a dilemma, it would be difficult to adopt any other position.
But this dilemma, I think it is clear, is a false one. We should not normally expect
the law to in all cases give us decisive reason to do as it demands.51 Rather, I believe
we should expect the law in many cases to add to the balance of reasons in favor of
doing as it demands, by providing some reason for action. The strength of the reasons
so-provided by the law may vary according to which property or properties give it
normative force, but the reasons should be perceptible nonetheless when we look for
them. Often, such reasons will do the more important job not merely of providing
some reason to act but of contributing, alongside other reasons, to making it the case
that we ought to do as the law demands, in the decisive reason-implying sense—and
thus in part, we can add, to contributing to making it the case that we ought to do
the thing the law demands because the law demands it. And occasionally, or so I shall
argue, legal reasonsmay ground our obligations to do as the law demands not merely
49Here, as before, it is helpful if we understand the Pope’s law as something more than a mere
codification of God’s law.
50See inter alia Dagger and Lefkowitz, “Political Obligation”; Green, “Legal Obligation and Author-
ity.”
51I think we should make this claim even if we believe, as some do, that the law claims for itself the
authority to create obligations, in the decisive reason-implying sense.
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in part but rather fully make it the case that we ought to do as the law demands. In this
way, then, we can see the law as giving us genuinely normative, content-independent
moral reasons to do as it demands, in a way that does not amount or tend to any
version of philosophical anarchism.
We can now turn to the more difficult question,
Which property or properties of the law, together with its demanding
that we act, may plausibly give us a reason to so-act?
It is worth emphasizing again that I shall pursue only the modest goal of attempt-
ing to show that certain properties of the law may plausibly help give us genuinely
normative, content- independent moral reasons for action, rather than attempting
to mount a conclusive or even very strong argument that they do so. I shall do this
by briefly sketching the ways in which theories of political and legal obligation may
be easily and plausibly recast as theories of political and legal reasons. And although
this weakens these theories, it also makes them more plausibly true; and moreover,
when viewed in this way, I think we may more clearly see how these theories may
together give us something resembling a blanket obligation to obey the law.52
I should first point out that many of the leading non-voluntarist theories of political
and legal obligation may be recast as more modest theories of sources of political
and legal reasons. Fair play theories provide a clear example. When Nozick objects,
for instance, that we cannot come under an obligation to others simply because they
have conferred some benefit upon us, we may answer that the conferral of certain
benefits may nonetheless generate some reason for us to participate appropriately in
the system of benefits.53 Such an answer is plausible even in his famous public
address system case: when it is your turn, you are, let us agree, not obligated to
perform, in the sense that you do not have a decisive reason to do so, but if you
have enjoyed the fruits of the cooperative enterprise, then you may plausibly have
some reason of fairness to do your part in the future. In the analog case of the state,
this may result in reasons of fairness to obey the law. (I do not argue that this is
clearly true, only that it is very plausibly true—and much more plausibly true than
its original obligatory counterpart.)
Or, to take a similar example, when Klosko claims that:
(A) if some state is a cooperative enterprise, and
(B) if this state, through its laws, provides its citizens with presumptively benefi-
cial, fairly distributed goods;
52See Klosko, “Multiple Principles of Political Obligation,” who explores a version of this view.
53Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 90–95.
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He might conclude either that
(C) the state’s citizens have an obligation of fairness to obey its laws,
or, instead, more modestly that
(D) the state’s citizens have reasons of fairness to do as its laws demand.
Klosko’s conclusion is in fact (C) but it need not be. (D) is a weaker conclusion and
is thus easier to establish and open to fewer objections. It is also, I think, much
more immediately plausibly true. The reasons given by (D) may or may not amount
to an obligation to do as the law demands, but would rather provide us with some
reasons, by counting in favor of our doing so.
Note here one important fact, which is that for theories like this to successfully give
us genuinely normative content-independent legal (and moral) reasons for action, it
must be some part of the law that provides us with the goods whose receipt grounds
our reasons to obey the law’s demands. That is to say, if we have reasons in virtue of
some principle of fairness to do our part in some collective enterprise, those reasons
are only legal reasons of the kind we have been here discussing if the product of the
collective enterprise is in some way secured by the law. Otherwise, our reasons to
do our part will be just that, and any specifically legal demand that we do so will
merely restate those reasons rather than giving us new, additional ones.
Other non-voluntarist theories of political and legal obligation may be similarly
recast in this way, including theories built around principles of gratitude, samar-
itanism, and natural duty. That is because all such theories identify some moral
principle that, they argue, is operative in virtue of the existence or some other fea-
ture of the law. Any such theory, as in the case of fair play theories, may more easily
establish that the moral principles they identify provide some reason to obey the law
than that they provide normally decisive reasons to do so.
Recasting these theories in this way has benefits beyond making their conclusions
easier to establish. Understood as independent sources of reasons to obey the law,
these theories may be very naturally combined to generate stronger reasons to obey
the law than any one of them provides on its own. It may also be the case that some
principles provide reasons to obey the law in only some rather than all domains, or
reasons whose strength varies across different domains of the law. Combining such
principles may allow us to claim that there are widespread reasons to obey the law,
because it is the law, in ways that would be impossible drawing on any one principle
alone. Acknowledging this possibility, moreover, may help our theories better match
our sense that it is in some cases much more important to obey the law than in other
cases. The question facing these recast theories is thus not, “Is the principle relied
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upon by this theory sufficient to generate wide-ranging obligations to do as the law
demands?” but, muchmore modestly, “Does the principle relied upon by this theory
generate reasons to do as the law demands?”
A similar point may be made about theories attempting to ground an obligation to
obey the law in the fact of some laws’ democratic provenance. Such theories claim
that
[L was generated by a democratic process] and [L demands that S 𝜑]
together ground [S has an obligation to 𝜑].
Naturally, however, we might instead make the more modest claim that
[L was generated by a democratic process] and [L demands that S 𝜑]
together ground [S has a reason to 𝜑].
In these claims, of course, [L was generated by a democratic process] stands in for a
more complex statement of the feature or features had by democratic laws in virtue of
which those subject to them may be obligated or have reason to do as they demand.
When Christiano argues, for instance, that (roughly) democratically created laws
treat each citizen equally with respect to certain questions about what we together
should do, regarding which no one has greater claim or standing to give an answer
than any other, or when Kolodny writes that “[t]he concern for democracy is rooted
in a concern not to have anyone else above—or, for that matter, below—one,” each
is arguing that it is this more specific feature of democratically created laws which
in part grounds our obligation to obey those laws.54
This is not, I should say again, the place to engage in a discussion of whether Chris-
tiano’s or Kolodny’s claims, or those of other democratic theorists, about democratic
political obligation succeed, nor do I here mean to endorse either’s claim to that ef-
fect or my suggested weaker version of those claims. Rather, I mean only to claim
that these arguments provide plausible accounts of one source of genuinely norma-
tive, content-independent moral reasons to do as the law demands; and that, as with
the non-voluntarist accounts I made similar claims about earlier, such accounts of
the source of legal reasons may be combined with others, and may vary in presence
and strength across different domains of the law.
Some consent theories may also be recast in this way. According to consent theories,
S is obligated to obey L just when and because some combination of (1–4) holds:
1. Ordinary consent S has consented to do as L demands; or
2. Tacit consent S has tacitly consented to do as L demands; or
54Christiano, “The Authority of Democracy”; Kolodny, “Rule over None II.”
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3. Hypothetical consent S would so-consent if S knew all the facts,
deliberated rationally, and so on; or
4. Normative consent S should so-consent.55
Of course, if S has consented to obey the law, it may often be accurate to claim
that S is obligated to do as it demands, because S’s consent grounds a normally
decisive reason to do so. But it is worth emphasizing with respect to conditional
and normative consent theories that these theories may be much more plausible as
theories of the sources of reasons to do as the law demands rather than the sources of
obligations to do so. It is much more plausible, for example, to argue that [S would
consent to obey the law] gives S a reason to obey the law than that it gives her an
obligation to do so.56 (Of course, such a reason may alongside others amount to a
decisive reason. In this way, conditional or normative consent to a law may partially
ground an obligation to obey it.)
There is one other plausible source of genuinely normative, content-independent
moral reasons to obey the law that I wish to take a bit more time over here, because
I believe it may be of particular importance. This source is the law’s often unique
ability to solve coordination problems.
It will help to consider the case of traffic laws. Those of us who drive each have
some reasons not given by the law to drive in certain ways: these can be helpfully
summed up by saying that we have all the summary reason to drive safely. One of
the reasons summarized by this reason is the reason we all have to drive on one side
of the road; another is to drive at a safe speed. But these reasons are in an important
sense incomplete. If we are driving, say, on many highways in the United States, we
have reasons to drive on the right side of the road and to drive in the vicinity of 55
mph. When we are in other places and on other roads, these reasons change. But
wherever we are, these reasons are grounded by facts about the law.
This last claim might be doubted. The speed at which we have reason to drive on
some road, for instance, is determined partly by the road itself, by the capabilities
of our cars, and by how fast and how many others are traveling. It may seem that
the legal speed limit is superfluous, or that it merely formalizes these other reasons.
But this argument neglects the further reason we all have to drive in the vicinity of
some single, particular speed. Which speed this is may be limited by the road, our
55The term “normative consent” is owed to Estlund. See his Democratic Authority. Hobbes may be
thought of as a forerunner of this view.
56See Enoch, “Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy”; Stark, “Hypothetical Consent
and Justification.”
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cars, and how many of us there are, but this speed is not fully determined by these
facts. The law accomplishes this latter task.
Similarly, it may be rightly pointed out that the law is not a necessary ground of our
reasons to drive on this or that side of the road. If there were no law concerning
which side of the road to drive on, people might just work out for themselves some
convention. If they did, these people would have a reason to drive on whichever side
of the road that convention dictated.
Equally, if the law in some place demanded that we all drive on the left, whereas in
fact everyone followed the practice of driving on the right, each driver would have
most reason to drive on the right—and it is plausible to think that each driver would
have no reason to drive on the left.
But this is not an objection to the view I am defending. I do not claim that the law
is a necessary ground for our reasons to drive on one side or another, or to drive at
a certain speed; I am claiming only that it is in fact the ground of many of our actual
such reasons. It is not enough to say that we each have a reason to drive on the
side of the road on which most other drivers drive. We together must at some point
take some actions or decisions which determine the particular side that is. This
could take the form of legislation, or it could be established through more complex
patterns of convention. In the actual case of the United States, I submit that it is the
law that secures the relevant convention; it is the fact that the law demands that we
drive on the right which partially grounds our reason to drive on the right. In other
words, we cannot state the facts which ground
[we each have reason to drive on the right side of the road in the United
States]
or
[we each have reason to drive near 55 mph on certain highways in the
United States]
without making reference to the fact that the law demands that we do so. We may
thus, as I argued earlier, call our reasons to drive in these ways content-independent
legal reasons.57
Reasons given by coordination problems solved by the law such as these may be, I
57It might be further objected that the law here merely happens to provide the relevant convention—
that the reasons to drive on the right side of the road, or around 55 mph, are not grounded by the law
in virtue of its being the law, or in other words by the law’s authority as such, but rather by the law in
virtue of its establishing the relevant convention. But the fact that the law establishes certain conventions
may quite plausibly be part of what grounds its authority in the relevant domains.
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believe, quite weighty reasons. Very seldom will I have sufficient reason to drive on
the side of the road other than the side demanded by the law. I think it is therefore
fair to say that we are obligated to drive on the side of the road demanded by the law,
and we are so-obligated because it is what the law demands.
We can next observe that traffic laws are not a special case, but rather one of very
many sets of laws whose purpose is to solve coordination problems. I shall not de-
fend this claim at length here, except to mention that many of the core functions
of political organization are to help us live our lives together, and include the es-
tablishment of property regimes, monetary systems, rules of exchange, and indeed
traffic laws, all of which are at least partly conventional; and so the reasons we
may have with respect to these domains of law will be at least partly grounded in
the fact of the law’s demands.58 If I am right that conventionally-determined rea-
sons of this kind are genuinely normative, content-independent moral reasons for
action, then it seems that they are quite widespread and quite forceful. On their
own they might license my claim that we do plausibly often have genuinely norma-
tive, content-independent moral reasons to obey the law; and combined with the
other plausible sources of such reasons I have already mentioned, we may well be
obligated to obey the law, because it is the law, much more often than we might
otherwise have thought.
5. Conclusion
It may now help to sum up some of my main claims. I have argued that when we
consider the question,
Do we have reasons to do as the law demands, because it is what the
law demands?
we should understand the “because” in the question as the because of grounding.
58David Lewis mentions this in Convention, and there is also a sizeable jurisprudential literature con-
cerning coordination, convention, and the law. See inter alia Gans, “The Normativity of Law and Its
Co-Ordinative Function”; Ullmann-Margalit, “Is Law a Co-Ordinative Authority?”; Postema, “Coor-
dination and Convention at the Foundations of Law”; Green, “Law, Co-Ordination and the Common
Good”; Green, The Authority of the State, ch. 4; and Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 30. Marmor, “The
Dilemma of Authority,” admits that coordination problems can ground obligations but also claims
that this cannot explain the full extent of the law’s normative power. Like Ripstein, I am inclined to
disagree. On Ripstein’s construction of Kant’s political philosophy, nearly all of our political duties
are “determined” in this way by the state and the state’s laws. For some considerations along these
lines, see Ripstein, Force and Freedom, as well as Pallikkathayil, “Deriving Morality from Politics”; Julius,
“Independent People”; and Julius, “Public Transit.”
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On the view I have defended, if we have such reasons, it is because there is some
fact about the law that at least partially grounds the fact that we have such a reason.
This, on my view, is what we should mean when we claim that the law may be a
source of content-independent reasons to do as it demands.
I argued next that, once we see that this is what it is to be a content-independent
reason to obey the law, we can see that we very plausibly have many such reasons.
This is because many of the leading theories of political and legal obligation may
be recast as theories about content-independent reasons to do as the law demands.
When recast in this way, these theories’ main claims are easier to establish; and
although they are thereby individually weaker, they may gain the advantage of being
true, and they may also be combined with each other to provide stronger summary
reasons to obey the law. Understanding our reasons to obey the law in this way, I
claimed, may also help explain our intuition that such reasons may vary in strength
across various circumstances and the various domains of the law. If these theories
may be recast and combined in this way, I also argued, and if the law is a source
of content-independent reasons for action in the many cases in which it helps solve
coordination problems, then such legal reasons may very often be sufficiently strong
to make it the case that we ought to obey the law. In other words, we may often
have more than content-independent moral reasons to obey the law—we may have
obligations to do so.
I have also argued that we need not be philosophical anarchists just because we be-
lieve that no one theory of political and legal obligation has successfully established
such an obligation. We should, I suggested, be engaged in the more modest enter-
prise of looking for reasons to obey the law, and then investigating their strength and
the domains over which they range. In this way, I believe, we are likely to find a pic-
ture of our reasons for obeying the law that more accurately reflects our considered
views, and, importantly, a picture that does not tend toward anarchism.
Harvard University
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